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COMMENTS
DELEGATION OF POSSESSOR'S DUTY TO WARN THE
EMPLOYEE OF AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR OF
DANGEROUS CONDITIONS ON THE LAND
I
When the possessor of land employs an independent contractor to per-
form work on his land the possessor normally has no direct contact with
the contractor's employees and often has no knowledge of their identity or
number. Recognizing this situation, a few courts have absolved the pos-
sessor from liability for injury to the contractor's employees caused by latent
dangerous conditions on the land if the possessor was cautious enough to
warn the contractor of the dangers involved. Other courts have refused to
permit a delegation of the duty to warn of latent dangerous conditions and
have held the possessor liable for injury to the contractor's employees despite
a warning to the contractor.
A series of decisions in Pennsylvania, where the defense of warning to
the contractor has in some cases been recognized and where a considerable
body of case law has evolved in the area, is illustrative. Myers v. Edison
Elec. Illuminating Co.,1 decided in 1909, seemed a harbinger of recognition
of the defense in that state. Plaintiff was injured by current from unin-
sulated wires while working in a room in defendant corporation's power
plant. The court affirmed the granting of defendant's motion for nonsuit
on the ground that it was not negligent in failing to instruct plaintiff of the
dangers involved in the work. After pointing out that the dangers were
as obvious to the plaintiff and his employer as they were to defendant,
the court stated:
"[Plaintiff] was not an employee of the defendant company, but
of an independent contractor, to whom he must look if he was not
properly instructed as to the dangers of the place where he was work-
ing. . . . When the plaintiff was selected to work in the room where
the accident occurred, which was a dangerous place, the defendant com-
pany was not aware of his selection to do the work. It was an act
with which it had nothing to do, and not knowing that he was going
there to work, it would be exacting entirely too much of it to require
that it should have instructed him as to the dangers." 2
1. 225 Pa. 387, 74 Atl. 223 (1909).
2. 225 Pa. at 389, 74 AUt. at 224. See also Rugart v. Keebler-Weyl Baking Co., 277
Pa. 408, 412, 121 AtI. 198, 199 (1923).
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Several years later, however, the Pennsylvania court rejected the above
language as mere dictum and held that it was not error to exclude evidence
offered by the possessor of land that plaintiff's employer, an independent
contractor, had noticed a defective fire escape while examining the work to
be done on the premises but failed to warn plaintiff of the risks involved.3
The court justified its ruling that the evidence was inadmissible on the
theory that the contractor's neglect would not relieve the possessor of his
duty to warn the plaintiff.4
It was not until 1940 that Pennsylvania clearly stated its position that
the possessor of land could delegate his duty to warn persons entering the
land of latent dangers thereon. In Valles v. Peoples-Pittsburgh Trust Co.,
the basement wall of defendant bank had been damaged by a flood and an
independent contractor, DeGiovanni, was employed to take down the wall
and rebuild it. Plaintiffs, employees of the contractor, were injured when
a pipe running along the damaged wall which contained ammonia to cool
water in the building was accidently broken during the removal of the wall.
The plaintiffs contended that, although the pipe was not shown to be de-
fective, it was a dangerous condition and therefore the defendant was negli-
gent in failing to warn them of its contents or stop the flow of the dangerous
substance while the work was being performed. The court on appeal
reversed judgment for plaintiffs, holding the exclusion of defendant's evi-
dence that the contractor was informed of the contents of the pipe and the
dangers incident thereto to have been error:
"If there was a breach of duty to the workmen it was DiGiovanni's
and not appellant's. . . . Defendant performed its duty when it gave
notice to DiGiovanni; it would be unreasonable to require warning to
every sub-contractor and laborer who entered the premises, on the
theory that it was appellant's duty to foresee that the contractor would
not perform his duty and so permit the work to be done improperly." 6
The court added that it was plaintiff's burden to prove that defendant did
not warn the contractor of the dangerous pipe that caused the injury, and
since he had failed to do so judgment should be entered for defendant.
7
It reasoned that imposition of this burden on plaintiff would not be un-
reasonable since testimony by the contractor concerning instructions given
by the possessor would be as available to the plaintiff as to the defendant.
8
3. Newinghamn v. J. C. Blair Co., 232 Pa. 511, 81 AtI. 556 (1911).
4. Id. at 516, 81 AtI. at 558.
5. 339 Pa. 33, 13 A.2d 19 (1940).
6. 339 Pa. at 41, 13 A.2d at 23.
7. Cf. Pennsylvania Util. Co. v. Brooks, 229 Fed. 93 (3d Cir. 1916) (recognized
that the duty to warn of dangerous conditions could be delegated but put the burden
on defendant to prove that the warning to the independent contractor revealed the
exact nature of the danger).
8. In Straight v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 354 Pa. 391, 47 A.2d 605 (1946), the Valles
rule was held inapplicable since plaintiff sustained his burden of proving that de-
fendant failed to warn the contractor of the latent dangerous condition that caused
the injury. Accord, Schon v. Scranton-Springbrook Water Serv. Co., 381 Pa. 148,
112 A.2d 89 (1955).
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The Valles doctrine has been applied by the Pennsylvania courts to
relieve a possessor of liability for this type of injury only twice since the
1940 decision.9 The first of these decisions, Engle v. Reider,10 involved
an employee of an independent contractor who was killed by fumes. The
fumes had accumulated in the attic of defendant's two-story commercial
building from a heater installed without a vent, the installer having recom-
mended to defendant that a vent was necessary. The court found no error
in the trial court's instruction to the jury that plaintiff had the burden of
proving that defendant failed to warn the contractor of the condition and
that the contractor did not know of the condition in the event no warning
was given.11 In thus affirming the second part of the charge, it would seem
that the Engle court not only followed the Valles rule on delegability and
burden of proof, but further established that the possessor of land need not
even warn the contractor if the latter discovers the condition himself.' 2
The second case to relieve a possessor of liability under the Valles rule
was Grace v. Henry Disston & Sons, Inc.13 A contractor was engaged by
the defendant corporation to move heavy machinery from one location in
defendant's building to another. Steel bars previously had been stacked in
a comer near the existing location of the machinery and while the con-
tractor's men were attempting to move a machine vibrations set up by
defendant's machinery operating in other parts of the building caused the
bars to fall on the plaintiff. The court reiterated the rule that the possessor
of land has merely the duty to warn the contractor of the condition and
went on to state that the defendant did not have to give any warning where
the contractor knew of the bars and the vibrations.
14
Recent Pennsylvania cases have refused to apply the Valles rule.
Generally speaking these recent decisions may be grouped into two types
of factual situations: (1) those where the dangerous condition involved
the use of electricity,'5 and (2) those where the danger was created by
9. The Valles rule was followed in several other cases by federal courts applying
Pennsylvania law in diversity of citizenship cases. See, e.g., Linker v. Container Corp.,
96 F. Supp. 911 (E.D. Pa. 1951), where recovery was denied the employee of a con-
tractor who was injured when he fell through a tarred-over sky light while working
on the roof of defendant's building. The evidence showed that the contractor knew
of the danger but failed to warn the plaintiff, and the court held that it was not error
to instruct the jury that the defendant was under no duty to warn an independent
contractor with knowledge of the danger.
10. 366 Pa. 411,77 A2d 621 (1951).
11. 366 Pa. at 416, 77 A.2d at 624.
12. The dissenting opinion expressed the view that the Valles doctrine should
not be extended to this case since the dangerous condition was neither a necessary
or proper one as it had been in the Valles case.
13. 369 Pa. 265, 85 A.2d 118 (1952).
14. 369 Pa. at 272, 85 A.2d at 119.
15. Cooper v. Heintz Mfg. Co., 385 Pa. 296, 122 A.2d 699 (1956). See also Stark
v. Lehigh Foundries, Inc., 388 Pa. 1, 130 A.2d 123 (1957) (Court allowed recovery
by the employee of a contractor injured when the crane on which he was a helper
became electrified by a power line while unloading railroad cars on defendant's
property, notwithstanding the fact that the contractor knew of the danger of the lines
but failed to warn plaintiff of the danger or to provide the crane with a ground.).
See cases cited note 38 infra. But cf. Myers v. Edison Elec. Illuminating Co., 225 Pa.
387, 74 Atl. 223 (1909).
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activity of defendant and his personnel as distinguished from a passive con-
dition such as a pipe filled with ammonia or a loft containing deadly fumes.
1'
The clearest illustration of the Pennsylvania court's refusal to apply the
Valles rule to cases involving electricity is Cooper v. Heintz Mfg. Co. In
this case defendant company engaged an independent contractor to con-
struct a building around a transformer tower which supplied electricity
to defendant's plant. Initially the transformer was turned off, but before
the construction was completed the current was restored for defendant's
operations. The court rejected defendant's contention that it was relieved
from liability for the injury sustained by an employee of the contractor who
came in contact with the transformer, by reason of a warning to the con-
tractor that the transformer was to be reactivated. The Valles decision
was held inapplicable on the ground that in this case the defendant retained
"control" over the dangerous condition, the proof of control being that the
transformer was supplying electricity to the defendant's plant while the
contractor was still working on the building. 17 The other situation in
which courts applying Pennsylvania law have held the Valles rule inap-
plicable can best be illustrated by the case of Kakias v. United States Steel
Co.,'5 which involved an injury to the employee of a contractor caused by
the starting of machinery without warning in defendant's plant where he
was working. The defendant contended that the contractor had been fully
apprised of the dangers incident to the continued operation of the ma-
chinery in the plant, but the court distinguished the Valles decision by
pointing out that the plaintiff was not injured by an "unsafe condition" and
therefore the rule was not applicable.'9
The defense that the plaintiff must prove that the contractor was not
warned of the dangerous condition which caused injury to one of his em-
ployees has been raised in jurisdictions other than Pennsylvania on very
few occasions. An early New Jersey case, Sommer v. Public Serv.
Corp.,21 held plaintiff's complaint not to be defective merely because it
failed to allege that the plaintiff's employer, an independent contractor, had
not been warned that wires on defendant's roof where the work was to be
performed were uninsulated. The court wrote that "if the contractor knew
16. Kakias v. United States Steel Co., 214 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1954). See also
cases cited note 40 infra.
17. Cooper v. Heintz Mfg. Co., 385 Pa. 296, 301, 122 A.2d 699, 702 (1956). It
is difficult to see how the continued supply of ammonia through the pipe in Valles
constitutes any less "control" than was found by the court in Cooper. However, the
cases are distinguishable on other grounds. See text at note 37 infra.
18. 214 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1954).
19. 214 F.2d at 436.
20. A partial explanation of the infrequency of decisions on this point may be
found in the provisions in workmen's compensation statutes making the possessor
the "statutory employer" of the injured employee if the work which the contractor
performs is work which this employer, or employers in similar businesses, would
ordinarily do through employees. In this situation the possessor would normally be
immune from common-law suit. 1 LARsow, WoRaximN's COMPMNSAION LAW § 49.12
(1952).
21. 79 N.J.L. 349, 75 Atl. 892 (Sup. Ct. 1910).
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the danger and failed to warn decedent he became also a tort-feasor, but
that would not relieve the defendant from liability." 22 The result is con-
sistent with the Pennsylvania cases involving electricity, as for example
the Cooper decision2 3 In a more recent New Jersey case, Farrell v.
Diamond Alkali Co.,s 4 an employee of a contractor was injured by chrome
dust which filled the air in defendant's plant. The contract for repair of the
plant specifically noted the danger of breathing chrome dust and provided
that the contractor should provide his employees with protective equipment,
but he failed to do so. Despite the warning given to the contractor, the
court held that the issue of defendant's negligence in failing to warn the
plaintiff directly was properly submitted to the jury. The court relied
heavily on the fact that the plaintiff had reported to defendant's plant
doctor at the first sign of ill effects and the latter failed to mention the cause
of the illness or to instruct plaintiff not to continue working in the plant
without protective equipment.25 Defendant's personnel knew that the con-
tractor had failed to safeguard his employees and they had ample oppor-
tunity to warn plaintiff directly when he reported for treatment. The court,
however, went on to say that it recognized "that notice to a reputable
independent contractor ought ordinarily be deemed sufficient" to relieve the
defendant of liability.
26
A recent Texas decision apparently adopted the Valles rule. In Texas
Elec. Serv. Co. v. Holt 27 an employee of a contractor was fatally injured
by coming in contact with electrical wires while working on defendant's
land. Defendant notified the contractor that the wires were to be put into
use but no warning was given to plaintiff. In reversing judgment for
plaintiff and dismissing the case, the court stated that defendant was "not
legally required to notify each employee of the independent contractor"
since "it is seldom an employer knows the employees of his independent
contractor" and cannot be held to foresee that the warning will not be passed
on to the individual employees 28 However, great weight was given to the
fact that the contractor told defendant that work in the area where the
injury occurred was completed and therefore the invitation to plaintiff
had been exceeded.
The only other jurisdictions in which cases have been discovered deal-
ing with the delegation of the duty to warn the employee of an independent
contractor of latent dangerous conditions are California,29 Minnesota, 0
22. 79 N.J.L. at 351, 75 Atl. at 893.
23. See text at note 15 supra.
24. 16 N.J. Super. 163, 83 A.2d 900 (App. Div. 1951).
25. 16 N.J. Super. at 169, 83 A.2d at 903.
26. Ibid.
27. 249 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
28. Id. at 666-67.
29. Sullivan v. Shell Oil Co., 234 F2d 733 (9th Cir. 1956) ; Dobbie v. Pacific Gas
& Elec. Co., 95 Cal. App. 781,273 Pac. 630 (1928).
30. Smith v. Twin City Rapid Transit Co., 102 Minn. 4, 112 N.W. 1001 (1907).
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and New Hampshire.8 ' In all of the cases arising in these jurisdictions the
contention that warning to the contractor should be adequate was specifically
rejected. These cases, with one exception, 2 involved electricity and the
results reached are, therefore, consistent with the Cooper and similar deci-
sions in Pennsylvania.83
II
In all the above cases, analysis proceeds from the assumption that
because the employee is on the premises under an invitation from the pos-
sessor and his presence is of economic benefit to the possessor, the possessor
is under a duty to use reasonable care to see that the employee is not
injured by latent dangersY4 The problem is to determine whether and
in what circumstances reasonable care as a matter of law should require
only that the possessor warn the contractor of the danger. Initially a dis-
tinction is properly made between those situations in which the employee
will be able to proceed with his work safely if the danger is made known
to himas and those situations in which mere knowledge that a danger is
present will not be sufficient to permit the employee to encounter it without
an unreasonable risk of injury8 6 This latter situation is illustrated by the
dangers which were present in the Cooper and Kakias cases. In Cooper,1
even if the contractor had conveyed the information to his employees that
the transformer which was being enclosed had been returned to operation,
the danger of arcing made it virtually impossible for the plaintiff to com-
plete the enclosure safely.88 Similarly, in Kakias,39 the plaintiff was re-
quired to work near the machinery in defendant's plant, and a detailed
warning as to the risks involved would not have enabled him to avoid injury
31. Stevens v. United Gas & Elec. Co., 73 N.H. 159, 60 At. 848 (1905).
32. Sullivan v. Shell Oil Co., 234 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1956).
33. See text at note 15 supra.
34. This accords with the Restatement view and that of most prominent writers
on tort law. E.g., James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to Licen-
sees and Invitees, 63 YALi L.J. 605, 615 (1954).
35. Under the Restatement of Torts view the "possessor of land is subject to
liability for bodily harm caused to business visitor by a natural or artificial condition
thereon if, but only if, he (a) knows, or by the exercise of reasonable care could
discover" the latent dangerous condition and fails "(i) to make the condition reason-
ably safe, or (ii) to give a warning adequate to enable them to avoid the harm'
2 RSTATSM~iMr, TORTs § 343 (1934). It would seem that the Restatement thereby takes
the position that in all cases of injury by a dangerous condition a warning to the
injured party is sufficient to relieve the possessor of land from liability. 2 HAPM,
& JAMxs, TORTS § 27.13 (1956).
36. See 2 HARWZR & JAMZS, op. cit. supra note 35, § 27.13; PRossma, TORTS §
78 (2d ed. 1955). See also McCracken v. Curwensville Borough, 309 Pa. 98, 163 At.
217 (1932) (plaintiff's knowledge of ice held not to relieve defendant of liability).
37. See text at note 15 supra.
38. Dicta in two recent federal court cases applying Pennsylvania law support
the proposition that under the law of that state a warning does not necessarily relieve
the possessor from liability to a contractor's employee injured by the use of elec-
tricity on the premises. Giannone v. United States Steel Corp., 238 F.2d 544 (3d Cir.
1956); Hamilton v. United States, 143 F. Supp. 179, 182 (W.D. Pa. 1956).
39. See text at note 18 supra.
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when a machine was started without warning by one of defendant's em-
ployees. 4° In situations where a warning directly to the employee would
not reasonably protect him from injury the courts have correctly refused
to apply the Valles rule. If a warning directly to the employee is inadequate,
it cannot be argued that a warning to the contractor should affect the pos-
sessor's liability. For the possessor to fulfill his obligations to the con-
tractor's employee nothing short of elimination of the danger should suffice.41
Where the Valles rule has been applied to absolve a possessor from
liability for injury to a contractor's employee the result has been justified
on the grounds that -the possessor is reasonable in relying on the contractor
to pass the warning on to his employees and that the possessor generally
has no opportunity to warn the employee directly.4 In somewhat similar
contexts this rationale is applied to permit delegation of a duty owed to a
third person. In determining the liability of a lessor to the invitees of his
tenant for injuries caused by latent dangerous conditions on the premises
the rule normally applied is that the lessor must warn the lessee of known
dangerous conditions existing at the time of the lease.43 However, once
the lessor has performed this duty it is the tenant's duty to inform persons
entering the premises by his invitation or permission of the dangerous
condition" The lessor is normally not present to warn persons likely to
encounter the dangers and he has no way of knowing what persons the
lessee will invite to enter. Similarly, in the Valles situation the posssessor
normally does not supervise the conduct of the work and has no way of
knowing the identity or number of employees the contractor will choose
to use.
So also the possessor of land may in many cases relieve himself of
liability to third persons for injuries caused by work being negligently
performed on his premises by hiring an independent contractor to perform
the work. Here again the rationale is similar to that used by the courts
applying the Valles rule. If the possessor has used care in selecting a
reputable contractor he may assume that due care will be used in the
performance of the work. Normally also the person who employs a con-
tractor does not have the specialized knowledge to permit him to prescribe
40. See 2 R5 tr xTZMNT, ToRas § 341 (1934). See also Brown v. American Steel
Foundries, 272 Pa. 231, 116 At. 546 (1922); Craig v. Riter-Conley Mfg. Co., 272
Pa. 219, 116 Atl. 167 (1922); Reed v. Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. Ry., 243 Pa. 562,
90 At. 359 (1914); cf. Rugart v. Keebler-Weyl Baking Co., 277 Pa. 408, 121 AUt.
198 (1923).
41. See note 36 .rupra.
42. 339 Pa. at 41, 13 A.2d at 23. See also Myers v. Edison Elec. Illuminating Co.,
225 Pa. 387, 389, 74 Atl. 223, 224 (1909).
43. Cutter v. Hamlen, 147 Mass. 471, 18 N.E. 397 (1888) ; Rhoades v. Seidel, 139
Mich. 608, 102 N.W. 1025 (1905); Charlton v. Brunelle, 82 N.H. 100, 130 At. 216
(1925) ; Cesar v. Karutz, 60 N.Y. 229 (1875). In some jurisdictions the lessor is under
a duty to warn the lessee of discoverable as well as known dangerous conditions. See,
e.g., Ames v. Brandvold, 119 Minn. 521, 138 N.W. 786 (1912).
44. 1 TIFOANY, LANDLORD AND TgNANT § 96(b) (1910). See also Eldredge,
Landlord's Tort Liability for Disrepair, 84 U. PA. L. Riv. 467 (1936).
45. Pitossia, Toars § 64 (2d ed. 1955).
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the manner in which the work should be conducted and he does not super-
vise the conduct of the contractor's employees.
Probably the most persuasive argument against accepting warning to
the contractor as an absolute defense rather than as merely a factor which
the jury should consider in determining whether the possessor used reason-
able care is that a cheap and efficient alternative to warning to the contractor
may be open to the possessor. For example, in the Valles case the defend-
ant bank could have easily placed a warning sign in the vicinity of the
contractor's operations marking the ammonia pipe. Similarly, in Engle
a sign giving notice of the dangerous fumes would have conveyed the
warning to the contractor's employees with little more effort than it took
to describe the dangers to the contractor.46 It was probably this type of
reasoning which led the court in Farrell, upon hearing evidence that de-
fendant's doctor had failed to warn plaintiff of his need for protective
equipment, to let the case go to the jury, despite a warning to the contractor.
All this is to suggest that even though in some cases a warning to the
contractor and reliance on him to relay the warning to his employees may
be reasonable, general application of a rule making warning a defense may
not be sufficiently discriminating: too many faulty defendants may be re-
lieved of liability. On the other hand, making warning to the contractor
merely another factor to be considered by the jury in determining if the
possessor used reasonable care under the circumstances does not account for
the fact that sympathetic juries, anxious to compensate injured plaintiffs,
may not afford warning its due weight. A possible compromise, though
admittedly a difficult one to administer, is to permit the court in its sound
discretion to apply the Falles rule when satisfied as a matter of law that
no cheap, efficient alternative to warning to the contractor was available
to the pxossessor.
46. Further the possessor will be able to seek indemnity from the contractor
for his failure to pass the warning on to the employee. 2 LAIsoN, WoRKmxN's
COPSA.TION LAv § 76.43 (1952). However, the recovery by the possessor from
the contractor may be limited to the amount the contractor would be liable to the
employee under workmen's compensation. E.g., Cooper v. Heintz Mfg. Co., 385 Pa.
296, 122 A.2d 699 (1956).
